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In the paper [Quantum Inf. Process. 14, 4237-4244 (2015)], Qin and Dai proposed a proactive
quantum secret sharing scheme. We study the security of the proposed scheme and find that it
is not secure. In the distribution phase of the proposed scheme, two dishonest participants may
collaborate to eavesdrop the secret of the dealer without introducing any error. Incidentally, a possible
improvement of the distribution phase is given.
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1. Introduction
As we all know, quantum secret sharing (QSS) is a counterpart of classical secret sharing in quantum
world. In QSS, a secret will be split into several pieces by a dealer, and each participant holds a piece,
and no subset of participants is sufficient to extract the secret, but the entire set is. Note that not all of
the participants in QSS are credible, moreover, a dishonest participant has more power to attack a QSS
scheme than a outside eavesdropper. Therefore, we should pay more attention to the attack of dishonest
participant(s) when analyzing the security. Recently, by using Bell states and unitary operations, Qin and
Dai [1] proposed a proactive QSS scheme, which has the three phases: the distribution phase, the updating
phase and the recovery phase. The Qin-Dai QSS scheme [1] is interesting because all participants in it
can periodically update their key shares, meanwhile, the secret of the dealer is changeless. However, it is
somewhat a pity that the Qin-Dai QSS scheme has a drawback of security. That is, in the distribution phase
of the scheme, the two dishonest participants (the first participant and the last participant) may collaborate
to eavesdrop the secret of the dealer without being detected.
2. Distribution phase in the Qin-Dai QSS scheme
Before describing our attack strategy, let us review the distribution phase in the Qin-Dai QSS scheme
as follows: (1) Alice generates a Einstein-Podolsky-Rose (EPR) pair sequence, which is denoted with
∗ Corresponding author. E-mail: gaogan0556@163.com
2{|Ψ〉x1,y1 , |Ψ〉x2,y2 , ..., |Ψ〉xm,ym} (here, xi, yi ∈ {0, 1}). Each EPR pair is randomly in one of the four
Bell states: |Ψ00〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/
√
2, |Ψ01〉 = (|00〉 − |11〉)/
√
2, |Ψ10〉 = (|01〉 + |10〉)/
√
2, |Ψ11〉 =
(|01〉 − |10〉)/√2. (2) Alice takes the first particle and the second particle from each EPR pair to form
[x] sequence and [y] sequence, respectively. (3) Alice prepares some decoy particles for eavesdropping
detection. (4) Alice inserts the decoy particles into the [y] sequence. Then she sends the [y] sequence
including decoy particles to Bob1. (5) After confirming that Bob1 receives the sequence, Alice and Bob1
start to check the security of the [y] sequence transmission by the decoy particles. (6) Bob1 encodes his
private key by performing the unitary operation Uu1
i
,v1
i
on the ith particle in the [y] sequence. (7) Bob1
inserts some decoy particles, which are prepared in advance, into the [y] sequence. Next, he sends the [y]
sequence to Bob2. Similarly, Bob2 and Bob1 check the security of the [y] sequence transmission by the
decoy particles. Then, Bob2 does the similar action as Bob1, and this process is continued until Bobn.
(8) Bobn sends the [y] sequence to Alice. Here, the security of the sequence transmission is checked by
the decoy particles that Bobn inserts into the [y] sequence. (9) The [y] sequence and the [x] sequence
are gotten back to the EPR pair sequence by Alice. Then she performs a Bell state measurement on each
EPR pair, and her measurement outcomes are denoted with {|Ψ〉x′
1
,y′
1
, |Ψ〉x′
2
,y′
2
, ..., |Ψ〉x′
m
,y′
m
}. (10) Alice
extracts the secret: (x1 ⊕ x′1, y1 ⊕ y′1, x2 ⊕ x′2, y2 ⊕ y′2, ..., xm ⊕ x′m, ym ⊕ y′m).
3. Insecurity of the Qin-Dai QSS scheme
In this section, we start to describe our attack strategy in detail. By the way, this attack strategy will be
implemented by the first participant (Bob1) and the last participant (Bobn). In other words, Bob1 and Bobn
can obtain Alice’s secret without help of the other participants by this attack strategy. This attack strategy
is described as follows:
In advance, Bob1 prepares a sequence composed of m EPR pairs, in which each pair is in |ψ〉ab =
(|01〉 − |10〉)/√2, and takes out a and b particles from each pair to form [a] sequence and [b] sequence,
which is also known by Bobn because they are a cahoot [2,3]. After the [y] sequence is received by Bob1,
firstly the security of the sequence transmission is checked, and then he performs the Uu1
i
,v1
i
operation on the
ith particle in the [y] sequence, and secretly sends the [y] sequence to Bobn. Next, Bob1 inserts some decoy
particles into the [b] sequence, and sends the [b] sequence, instead of the [y] sequence, to Bob2. After Bob2
receives the sequence, he also checks the security of the [b] sequence transmission with the decoy particles.
Since Bob2 can’t detect that Bob1 has played a replacing trick, he performs his secret unitary operations as
of old. Obviously, now Bob2’s unitary operations are not performed on particles in the [y] sequence, but
on particles in the [b] sequence, which is not known by Bob2. After encoding, Bob2 inserts some decoy
3particles into the [b] sequence and sends the sequence to Bob3. According to Step (7), Bob3,...,Bobn−1 will
do the similar action as Bob2. Then, Bobn−1 sends the [b] sequence to Bobn. In order not to be detected,
Bobn also checks the security of the [b] sequence transmission with Bobn−1’s inserting decoy particles.
Now, Bobn holds the [b] sequence and Bob1 holds the [a] sequence. Next, the two dishonest participants
perform Bell state measurement on each EPR pair. Since each EPR pair that Bob1 previously prepared
is in |ψ〉ab, by comparing the Bell state measurement outcome with |ψ〉ab, Bob1 and Bobn easily obtain
Ui = Uun−1
i
,v
n−1
i
U
u
n−2
i
,v
n−2
i
· · ·Uu2
i
,v2
i
. Afterwards, Bobn immediately performs the Uun
i
,vn
i
Ui operation on
the ith particle in the [y] sequence, and inserts some decoy particles into the [y] sequence, and sends the [y]
sequence including decoy particles to Alice. Since that Alice checks the security of the received sequence
transmission only depends on Bobn’s inserting decoy particles, she can not detect the eavesdropping of Bob1
and Bobn. From Step (10), we see that Alice’s secret is shown with (xi⊕x′i, yi⊕y′i). By simply calculating,
(xi ⊕ x′i, yi ⊕ y′i) is equal to (uni ⊕ un−1i ⊕ · · · ⊕ u1i , vni ⊕ vn−1i ⊕ · · · ⊕ v1i ) in Uuni ,vni Uun−1
i
,v
n−1
i
· · ·Uu1
i
,v1
i
.
According to the above analysis, we see there is a security loophole in the distribution phase of the
Qin-Dai QSS scheme, that is, Alice’s secret can not be safely shared among all the participants. Next, we
will give an improvement for the distribution phase of the Qin-Dai QSS scheme. In order to reserve the
character of the distribution phase, we will only change the method that Alice checks the security of the
[y] sequence transmission. In other words, our modifying content will focus on Step (8) in the distribution
phase of the Qin-Dai QSS scheme. We modify Step (8) as follows: (8′) Bobn sends the [y] sequence to
Alice. After confirming that Alice receives the [y] sequence, first, Bobn uses the decoy particles to check
the security that the [y] sequence is transmitted from Bobn to Alice. Then, Alice randomly selects some
EPR pairs, and randomly uses {|0〉, |1〉} basis or {|+〉 = (|0〉 + |1〉)/√2, |−〉 = (|0〉 − |1〉)/√2} basis
to measure the x particles in the selected EPR pairs. Next, she publishes the positions of the measured
x particles in the [x] sequence, and doesn’t publish her measurement outcomes. Alice requires that each
participant publishes the operations performed on the y particles in the same positions. Note that, the orders
that they publish the operations are random. After these, Alice uses a correct measuring basis to measure
the corresponding y particles. By comparing the deductive outcomes with the measuring outcomes, she
can judge whether the whole quantum channel is secure.
4. Conclusion
In conclusion, we have proposed a attack strategy on the Qin-Dai QSS scheme, and shown that, in
the distribution phase of the scheme, Bob1 and Bobn can collaborate to eavesdrop Alice’s secret without
introducing any error. In other words, we have proved that the Qin-Dai QSS scheme is not secure. We see
4that the distribution phase is the first phase in the Qin-Dai QSS scheme, and also most important phase.
However, the interesting phase in the Qin-Dai QSS scheme should be the second phase, that is, the updating
phase. For any quantum cryptography scheme, the security is essential. If the security can not be as-
sured, even if the framework of the designed scheme is interesting, the designed scheme has not much value.
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